Insurgencies have worrisome record
By
JOHN YAUKEY, Gannett News Service
It's a list Pentagon war planners are desperate to keep the campaign in Iraq off: great modern insurgencies. Insurgencies are a separate class of warfare. They pivot more on will, than force, and tend to be more political than military. This makes them extremely difficult to defeat. The goal of insurgents through history has been to make the conflict too politically costly back home for their enemy to sustain. The insurgencies of the last half-century have lessons valuable for helping to understand the conflict in Iraq, now approaching historic elections at month's end.
Vietnam (1964-75) It can be argued that near its end the Vietnam War was no longer an insurgency, but rather a conventional conflict being fought across a border with U.S. forces inflicting staggering damage on the enemy. It nevertheless ended the way insurgencies typically do, with a superior outside force leaving because it could no longer justify the fighting to its citizens back home. The lesson: You can win the big battles abroad but still lose the war back home.
Afghanistan (1979-89) In 1979, with the Vietnam War still fresh history, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in what was supposed to be a neat, surgical operation to prop up a client regime along an important border. The Soviets inflicted early heavy casualties on the insurgent mujahedeen using traditional large-war tactics. But this only primed the recruitment pump of the insurgents who hid and attacked then hid again. This denied the Soviets any place to concentrate their effort. Faced with a protracted conflict, the Soviets started to pull out in 1988. The lesson: Prepare to fight unconventional warfare. It's the warfare of the future.
Algeria (1954-62) The French fought Islamic insurgents for eight years in what turned out to be a futile attempt to hold onto colonial Algeria. By 1959, it appeared the French army was succeeding, but the insurgency re-erupted, driven by recruits rebelling against harsh French measures. At the height of the conflict, France had more than 400,000 troops in Algeria and ultimately killed almost as many Algerians. Still, in 1962, France gave up and left. The lesson: Force alone can't defeat insurgencies. Push too hard and risk losing more hearts and minds than you win.
Malaysia (1948-60) The British waged among the few successful counterinsurgencies of the 20th century. From 1948-51, they tried to crush the insurgents with sweeping military strikes. But these only alienated the locals. The turnabout came in 1952 when the British began transferring the political future of Malaysia into the hands of Malaysians while bolstering the local police force. The lesson for Iraq: Get the locals invested in their future, and then get out of the way. This is now the U.S. approach: Invest the Iraqis in their future with the upcoming elections and stand up an Iraqi security force capable of stabilizing the country. Then get out. |
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As Iraqi security gain
confidence, the Pentagon will gradually scale down the U.S. force size. The
hope is that this will reduce U.S. casualties, lower the American profile
in Iraq and start reassuring Americans that there is an end in sight.
